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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR
STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT
Washington, D.C.

STAFF MEMORANDUM)
NO. 50)

20 May 1946

POLICY CONCERNING NATIONALITY AND SECURITY OF PERSONNEL
(Supplement to General Order No. 12)

GENERAL

1. The purpose of this directive is to interpret in detail the policies and procedures to be followed in carrying out the provisions of the basic order, General Order No. 12. This policy is laid down in order to insure that only persons whose primary as well as superior and over-riding loyalty is to the United States and to the United States alone will be employed by the Strategic Services Unit in positions which permit them to know details of plans, operations, or personnel of SSU. It is unsafe to assume that SSU can depend indefinitely on the whole-hearted cooperation and unwavering loyalty of non-Americans or recently naturalized Americans, simply because their sympathies and interests are parallel with our own at the present time. The policy as established in the basic order and this supplement is laid down for the primary good of the SSU. It follows a general pattern adopted by similar organizations of the United States government and other nations. It is in no way aimed at any individual and is not to be construed as a reflection on the services or loyalty of any individual. It is the desire of the SSU to make maximum use of the assistance of all types of persons who are in a position to aid in accomplishing the mission of the SSU, but there will be a clear distinction made between the employees who are a part of the staff of the SSU and those who are used as agents in the collection of intelligence. It is necessary that the latter type, who will be for the most part non-Americans, be so handled that, in the event of any change in situation affecting their attitude toward the United States, they may be re-examined in the light of such change and their relations with SSU altered in the manner best suited to the interests of SSU and the United States. All Offices, Branches, Divisions, Desks and Missions are expected to cooperate whole-heartedly in the application of this policy, both in letter and in spirit.

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STAFF PERSONNEL

2. As stated in reference order, all SSU staff personnel, with the exceptions noted below, must be native-born American citizens of unquestionable loyalty who have no close blood or in-law relatives subject to the control or influence of any foreign power. No person will be employed by SSU in any staff capacity without prior security clearance by the Security Division, Washington, D.C., which will conduct a complete investigation covering all candidates for employment. No person will henceforth be employed or commence his duties on the basis of provisional security approval. These provisions apply to staff personnel recruited overseas as well as in the United States.

3. Where operational necessity compels, exception may be made to the provisions of para. 2 above in the case of a person not a native born American citizen who is held to be uniquely qualified for a given position considered to be of the utmost importance to the organization, and for whom no adequate employable substitute can be found. Such exception may be made only in strict conformity with the provisions of paras. 4 and 5 immediately below.

4. Any Office, Branch, Division, Desk or Mission of the SSU desiring to employ in staff capacity any person deemed to fall within the provisions of para. 3 above will present evidence to the Security Division, Washington, DC., justifying the need for the services of the candidate for employment and setting forth in detail his unique qualifications. If the Security Division is satisfied with the justification presented, it will proceed immediately with security investigation of the candidate. If the Security Division is not satisfied that exception is warranted on the basis of the evidence presented, the case will be referred to the Director of the SSU, who alone will have the authority to recommend that the candidate be investigated by the Security Division. On the basis of its investigation, the Security Division will recommend security approval or disapproval to the Director, SSU, who alone will have the authority to render final decision as to the employment of the candidate.

5. The records of all personnel presently employed by SSU in staff capacity will be reviewed by the Security Division, Washington, D.C., and those persons who do not conform to the provisions of para. 2 above, and for whom exception is not obtained from the Director, SSU, will be

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separated from employment by SSU as soon as possible. Each Office, Branch, Division, Desk or Mission will present to the Security Division not later than forty-five (45) days from the date of this order a list of those persons presently employed who do not conform to the provisions of para. 2 above, and for whom exception is desired. Evidence supporting each request for exception will be presented to the Security Division, Washington, D.C., which will then review the case in detail, making additional investigation if the Security Division considers it necessary. On the basis of its findings, the Security Division will recommend security approval or disapproval to the Director, SSU, who alone will have the authority to render final decision regarding the continued employment of the candidate for exception. Requests for exceptions under the provisions of paras. 4 and 5 should be kept to the minimum. Any person affected by the provisions of this paragraph who was on the roster of the SSU as of 1 April 1946 and for whom exception is to be requested may continue in his present duties until his case for exception is presented to the Security Division and final decision rendered by the Director.

6. It is recognized that the SSU has a moral obligation to employees who may have served faithfully and loyally over a period of time. Every effort will be made to cushion the severance of employees from the organization and to render such friendly assistance as is practical in meeting the problems of readjustment of such individuals.

HOUSEKEEPING PERSONNEL

7. All personnel to be employed by the SSU and assigned in any housekeeping or service capacity in any SSU establishment in the United States will be required to conform to the provisions of para. 2 above.

8. It is recognized that certain overseas stations will be unable to obtain native born American citizens for many of their housekeeping and service functions. Permission may be obtained to employ non-American housekeeping or service personnel at overseas stations and for the private establishments of SSU staff personnel overseas by obtaining clearance from the Security Officer of the station or the X-2 representative in the area if no Security Officer is assigned. Investigation in all such cases will consist of a positive local investigation as well as check of files of the local X-2 office, the central X-2 files in Washington, local Security Division files if any, and, if advisable,

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native police and security files. Investigation must in all cases be made and clearance obtained prior to employment. Complete report of any such investigation will be sent to the Security Division, Washington, D.C. Non-American housekeeping personnel will be handled and controlled so that they are unable to overhear conversations on classified subjects, have no knowledge of operational personnel and no access to files, classified documents, or classified trash.

9. Guards are considered as a special category of housekeeping personnel. It is appreciated that guards should have the qualifications of staff personnel, but it is also realized that for the time being it would be impossible to carry this out at certain stations. Even at headquarters, SSU is constrained to accept external guards over whom it has little vetting control. In view of the above facts, it is permissible temporarily for those stations, which cannot provide themselves with native born Americans for guard duty, to employ as guards, personnel native to the area concerned. Such guards will be investigated, handled, and controlled in conformity with the provisions of paragraph 8 above. All concerned are enjoined not to lapse into a false sense of security when guarded by men who do not measure up to staff personnel requirements. It is not to be forgotten that the local police can exert great pressure on native employees.

CONSULTANTS

10. Domestic consultants may be former SSU or OSS employees, foreign nationals, or others particularly suited to give expert advice or assistance in matters of intelligence interest. Contact with domestic consultants may be made only after prior approval by the Security Division, Washington, D.C. The Security Division will require all available background on any prospective consultant prior to his use, plus an indication of the extent of the use to be made of him, plus information on method and location of contact to be made. The Security Division will have the right to require time to conduct an adequate investigation to determine the security of a prospective consultant prior to his use.

11. Overseas consultants may be persons particularly suited to give assistance on matters of intelligence interest. They will be considered in all respects as Operational Personnel, and subject to the same regulations.

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OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL

12. It is not desirable to place any limitation on staff personnel in the field regarding the type and nationality of agents to be used in active operations, beyond the already existing policy of prior vetting of all such persons. Regarding the methods of handling, however, certain restrictions must be clearly understood and universally applied.

A. Any person who does not conform strictly to the definitions of staff or housekeeping personnel or domestic consultants must be considered as operational personnel. Each operational employee must be handled in such a way that he has no access to or knowledge of SSU offices, files or documents. Each operational employee should be permitted the minimum of knowledge of SSU plans and personnel necessary to brief him in his mission and enable him to maintain the necessary operational contacts. All recruiting and handling of operational personnel must be done with these basic provisions constantly in mind. Operational personnel may not be quartered, rationed or received in SSU establishments where they might come in contact with SSU staff or operational personnel other than the staff member or cutout by whom the contact is maintained. This is designed to eliminate the use of the so-called "Joe House" which, whatever its value as a wartime expedient, is considered dangerous as a feature of operations under present conditions.

B. Contacts with agents who are used by staff members for organizing networks or for expert information should be limited to the staff member operating the given case or his cutout. Such agents should be given information only on those intelligence targets which are his own immediate assignment. Such agent organizers or consultants should not be permitted access to SSU offices or installations.

THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY

13. During the war events proceeded at a rapid pace and the missions assigned to the OSS were of such an urgent nature that in many instances the basic requirements of good security had to be sacrificed for what was felt to be the more important consideration of producing results. Due to the confusion that accompanies all wars and to the fact that we were largely insulated from the main forces of enemy intelligence, loose security proved to be less costly than it might have. The OSS was not the only Allied

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agency which considered itself lax in its security, but this in itself was and is no excuse for laxness in our present and future operations.

14. It is generally recognized that the advent of peace, with the consequent opening of most closed areas to general travel, has multiplied the problems involved in establishing and maintaining a truly secure clandestine intelligence organization. It is also evident that the SSU will in the future have to become more and more independent, as we will be able to receive less assistance from most of our former Allies, and will be more concerned with keeping information on our operations strictly within the SSU. The organization has already undergone two metamorphoses in its development since the close of hostilities, and more changes may be experienced before we have reached our ultimate goal of organization as a secret intelligence agency. Staff members in the field will realize that the only way in which present more or less open missions can go completely under cover and still maintain continuity of action is for each station to observe increasingly rigorous standards of security, laying the groundwork for future long term operations as carefully as possible.

15. The regulations outlined above will serve to assure the organization insofar as possible of the basic security of all employees remaining with the SSU or to be employed in the future. Regulations in themselves, however, no matter how strict, will never guarantee security. It remains the individual responsibility of each person connected with the SSU to endeavor at all times and under all circumstances to carry out the provisions of existing security regulations in good faith, and to improvise when faced with new situations in order to provide good security with the full realization that individual lapses from secure practices may be of grave consequence to the organization and the United States Government.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

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